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A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO INVESTMENT IN CHINA:
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED AND KEYS TO SUCCESS*
ALLAN LIU**
I. INTRODUCTION
China was a late entrant in the competition for foreign investment.
The nation faced enormous challenges in 1979 to become accepted as a
credible investment partner. China had to create a basic investment
framework for private businesses to operate within a socialist culture.
Foreign and Chinese partners in the early joint ventures had to cope
with many contradictions and delays. Neither side had experience to
guide it. Nevertheless, investors were drawn from all over the world by
China's immense domestic market, its low-wage rates, technical skills,
natural resources, and an apparent commitment to reform.
After many setbacks and initial frustration experienced by some
investors, foreign investment in China has grown rapidly in the past
decade. Most investors are satisfied with the progress of their ventures,
and feel they have accomplished their goals. Following a slow start,
overall foreign investment in China (both utilized and contracted)
more than doubled in 1984 and came close to doing so again in 1985.
By the end of 1987, the Sino-foreign enterprises in China had earned
over $6 billion in foreign investment. The growth trend continued
throughout 1988, despite the economic retrenchment of domestic capi-
tal investment. A total of $4.03 billion in direct foreign investment was
pledged and approved between January and November 1988, an in-
crease of 45% over 1987. Utilized investment was $2.13 billion, a 60%
increase over 1987.
About 11,000 foreign investment concerns, including equity joint
ventures, contractual joint ventures and wholly-owned foreign ven-
tures, have been established in China. United States investors now ac-
count for about 14% of the total. Over 400 projects involving direct
investment, with a figure exceeding $3 billion, have been initiated by
the United States, making it the second largest foreign investor in
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China, next only to the Hong Kong-Macao region.
The first foreign investors in China learned many lessons from
which present and future investors can benefit. Some of them moved in
too early and too eagerly, with too little preparation. Consequently,
they soon became frustrated and disillusioned. Those who were com-
mitted to remaining in China for the long-term had more realistic
goals, and moved more methodically and patiently to establish solid
relationships for the future in China and the Pacific Basin.
II. THE SURVEY
I participated in the organization of a landmark study, in 1987, of
foreign investors' experiences in China. The report was jointly pub-
lished by the International Trade Research Institute of China and A.T.
Kearney Management Consultants of the United States.' The study
consisted of a comprehensive survey of a large number of manufactur-
ing, equity joint ventures involving investors from the developed world
who had a minimum of one year's operating experience in China. A
further study was conducted in 1988 to check the improvement of the
investment environment and the operations of these joint ventures.2
The focus of the studies was the investment objectives of both
Chinese and foreign partners-their independent evaluations of the
operating results of the joint ventures, the overall investment climate,
and their major operating concerns. A comparison of the respondents'
views on certain key subject areas would greatly help discern trends
subsequent to the 1987 study, and aid those making future investment
decisions.
A. Operating Results
When asked to compare operating performance to plan, the major-
ity of the respondents said they were satisfied with their results in
1988. The respondents confirming satisfactory performance in 1988 in-
creased to 91% from 60% the previous year. Those reporting serious
difficulties fell from 15% to 9%, and the group which had responded
"too soon to tell" in 1987 completely disappeared. The responses show
that performances on both the Chinese and foreign sides of joint ven-
tures are improving.
Fifty percent of all respondents in our 1987 survey reported they
1. A.T. KEARNEY MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS & INT'L RESEARCH INST. OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, MFG. EQUITY JOINT VENTURES IN CHINA: A PROGRESS REPORT AND
ExPERINc GuIDz (1997).
2. A.T. KEARNEY MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS & INT'L RESEARCH INST. OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, MFG. JOINT VENTURES: AN UPDATE (1988).
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exceeded target figures with respect to returns on investments, while
40% met their target, and 10% fell below target. In contrast, 64% re-
ported improvement of returns in 1988, and 9% reported no change
from the previous year; 27% were not willing to disclose this informa-
tion. The obvious improvement in returns has resulted, at least par-
tially, from the combined effects of the following factors:
1. Real increase in urban consumer income, in the range of
2% to 4% each year;
2. Emergence of an "upper income" group with larger dispos-
able income;
3. 20% growth in the volume of expenditures by tourists;
4. Considerable protection for joint ventures against imports,
introduced for key products in 1987; and
5. Substantially improved domestic marketing for established
joint ventures, subject to their ability to deal with the for-
eign exchange balance problems.
B. Foreign Exchange Balance
The largest problem for joint ventures, aimed primarily at the do-
mestic market, is meeting foreign exchange requirements. There have
been some improvements in this area in the past year. The problem,
however, still seriously retards the further growth of many joint ven-
tures. In the 1988 survey, 52% of the respondents retained a deficit in
foreign exchange, 18% reported a surplus, another 18% met their
needs, and 12% had no foreign exchange revenue at all. Despite vari-
ous remedial measures implemented by the government, it is still naive
to enter China's market without a clear strategy for dealing with for-
eign exchange requirements. "Fire-fighting" in a shortage situation is
expensive and can be highly disruptive.
C. Operating Concerns
The latest survey showed some changes in the order of relative
significance of major operating concerns to foreign investors:
Rank 1987/88 Operating Concern Rank 1986/87
1 Raw material/components 1
2 Joint venture/autonomy 3
3 Operating costs 6
4 Finance/borrowing 5
5 Implementation of laws 4
6 Foreign exchange balance 2
7 Management quality 7
1989]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The number one concern for joint ventures already in operation is
domestic raw materials, which are in short and irregular supply, typi-
cally suffer quality deficiencies, and are subject to price escalation. To
deal with this concern, the central and local governments have made
substantial efforts to organize more integrated supplier networks for
major joint ventures. They are providing foreign exchange to export-
oriented ventures for imported raw materials and components, while
investing heavily in upstream sectors.
Joint venture autonomy remains a major concern, indicating that
joint venture management is becoming more entangled with outside in-
terference while increasingly more day-to-day business decisions must
be made. Nevertheless, the over-all management reform in the domes-
tic economy will allow this issue to decline slowly in importance among
investor concerns.
Operating cost is a rising concern due to three adverse trends in
the cost of external services, as well as materials: (1) the shortage of
power and transportation, producing downtinqe and delays; (2) the
higher costs of imported commodities (such as steel and copper); and
(3) the general upward pressure on all domestic costs associated with
inflation and reduced infrastructure subsidies. According to joint ven-
ture managers, labor costs have also increased in nominal terms. The
real cost of labor appears to have decreased, however, when gradually
improving labor productivity is taken into account.
D. General Environment
While much remains to be accomplished, particularly in clarifying
the practical implications of recent structural changes and economic
retrenchment, our survey respondents believe the investment environ-
ment has improved considerably. The 1987 Provisions to Encourage
Foreign Investment were perceived as effective by 90% of the respon-
dents, while only 10% believed them ineffective. In addition, 64% of
the respondents thought that trends in the investment environment
were better, while 36% felt they remained the same as before. Most
managers evidently perceive the problems pertaining to infrastructure
to be a consequence of dynamic growth. Although annoying, the
problems are considered by the managers to be short-term and increas-
ingly manageable.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN 1988
The following characteristics can be detected from the foreign in-
vestment situation in 1988:
1. Expansion of the open economic regions in the coastal ar-
[Vol. 10
INVESTMENT IN CHINA
eas. Apart from the four Special Economic Zones and four-
teen coastal cities, the counties included in the open re-
gions have increased from 144 to 291; the newly added
areas equal to the total size of the open areas approved in
the previous nine years;
2. Further reduction of taxes and relaxation of the criteria for
qualifying for these tax benefits;
3. Granting the most favorable policies to Hainan province to
make it the largest special economic zone in the country;
4. Enlarging the approval authorities of various provinces,
municipalities and localities to further simplify the ap-
proval process for investment projects. About sixteen prov-
inces and municipalities are given authority to approve
projects with total investment over $30 million instead of
the previous $10 million limit; other localities now have au-
thority to approve $10 million instead of $5 million;
5. Creation of more foreign exchange swap centers to amount
to forty provincial level centers and fifty secondary local
centers. The foreign exchange sold by joint ventures in the
first half of 1988 exceeded those bought by about $130 mil-
lion, showing a better foreign exchange situation for most
joint ventures;
6. The approval in the past year of more wholly owned for-
eign ventures, partly owing to the credit squeeze for most
domestic enterprises. Approval was given to 240 of these
ventures in 1988, a six-fold increase over 1987 and 30%
more than the combined preceding nine years. Total in-
vestment value involved was $290 million.
It is obvious that many obstacles still have to be removed before
further investment, especially strategic investment, can occur in China.
Concerns of foreign investors need to be addressed with continuing ef-
forts. Chinese and foreign investors need to work together to improve
their strategies, and their management and partner relationships, while
the government will have to make further efforts to improve the in-
vestment environment.
IV. THE NEED FOR REALISTIC AND SYSTEMATIC STRATEGIES
A recent study on United States manufacturing competitiveness
indicated that companies with international operations generally enjoy
a greater competitive advantage because of their international aware-
ness and exposure to foreign competition abroad. These companies un-
dertake more efforts to improve their competitiveness than do their
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domestic counterparts, and they are more optimistic about their pros-
pects for future competitive advantage against foreign competition in
the domestic market. Taking action now to develop options in China is
one of the steps that can help a company become a greater competitor
in all markets in the 1990s.
China's size, complexity and importance demand special attention
in a company's long-term plans and strategies for entering that market.
Lessons need to be learned from the early failures caused by the hasty,
unprepared and unsystematic approaches taken by many investors.
Blaming the external environment is not a remedy in itself. Given the
same climate and condition, different investors could achieve signifi-
cantly different results. The difference stems from the universal truth
that the quality of people, the strategy adopted, and enterprising spirit
and business sense are integral parts of business success.
Many investors tend to ignore these basic business principles.
They have come to China with their own perceptions and beliefs,
which are often untested and spontaneous, and result in many unwise
decisions or hasty actions. In the end, they succeed in brewing only
failures and frustrations.
Based on our extensive research on foreign investor activities in
China and my personal experience in both studying and participating
in joint venture processes, the following key factors could potentially
benefit future investors in developing a strategy for China.
A. Compatibility of Objectives
Many foreign investors overlook the fact that the objectives of
their potential Chinese partners may be different from their own. Typ-
ically, the Chinese partners are interested in joint ventures with the
object of: (1) gaining export opportunities through their foreign part-
ners' international marketing networks; (2) obtaining advanced foreign
technology; (3) gaining more autonomy in decision-making because of
the joint venture's relative independence from government controls;
and (4) obtaining badly needed capital investment.
Foreign investors, in comparison, often have the following objec-
tives in mind when considering China as an investment opportunity:
(1) entry into the vast domestic market; (2) low-cost production base
for regional expansion and market penetration; and (3) strategic posi-
tioning for long-term implications.
It is obvious that the primary goals of the two sides tend to be in
conflict with each other and that these differences often affect the set-
ting of priorities and the steady relationship between partners. Before
committing themselves, foreign investors should seriously consider
these conflicts, by carefully investigating the real motives and objec-
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tives of their Chinese counterparts, and by explicitly stating their own
objectives so that no misconceptions or unrealistic anticipations could
undermine the relationship. Foreign investors should also be prepared
to adjust their own objectives and goals to match the realities in China,
if the investment undertakings are of strategic significance to them.
B. Research and Planning Before Action
The common-sense business approach of researching and planning
before taking action is often ignored by foreign executives when they
deal with investments in China. Instead, they think that China should
be treated as a special case.
Many foreign investors assume that their companies are household
names worldwide and that their technological superiority would cer-
tainly make Chinese businessmen eager to join them. Necessary pro-
motion and education are ignored. Surprisingly, some world-renowned
corporate names and brands, such as AT&T and Xerox, are unheard of
or mistaken by the Chinese consumers and business communities.
Some investors complain about the amount of effort and time they
have to commit before discovering that their efforts have failed. This
dissatisfaction is often caused by an investor's inability to obtain accu-
rate and sufficient information prior to the search, a lack of under-
standing of the competitive situation, and hasty actions based on un-
founded assumptions.
Many investors dealing with Chinese companies abandon normal
business principles and procedures, believing them unnecessary in such
an immature market. Chairmen and CEOs of corporations often per-
sonally take initial exploratory tours to China, dining and toasting in
the glamorous Great Hall of People, and leave China with a handshake
agreement on a joint venture. The puzzled operational men are then
ordered to work out the details, starting where the often misinformed
bosses have left off.
Very few foreign investors consider spending the time and money
for a thorough investigation into the viabilities of a proposed project
before committing extensive corporate resources in vain. Those who do
investigate and come to China with a well-defined strategy create more
successful joint ventures.
C. Serious Presentation and Building of Trust
Many foreign investors take for granted that they possess ad-
vanced technology, an important worldwide market share, and reputa-
ble business ethics. They often feel frustrated if their Chinese counter-
parts do not appreciate their superiority and have difficulty trusting
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the foreign investors. This is especially true for the negotiation of
prices and technology fees.
The more thoughtful investors, however, are willing to spend the
time to educate Chinese partners through a long process of serious
presentations, first-hand exposure to their technological superiority,
and a persistent effort to build good personal relations. Foreign inves-
tors should never take their superiority for granted. It is not just a
question of ego; the lack of trust of foreigners is deeply rooted in the
dark memories of modern Chinese history.
D. Focus of Efforts and Flexibility
Limited resources do not permit battling too many issues through
the negotiation process. Therefore, investors should set priorities for
their goals. No deals could be struck in China without compromise.
The question remains, however, where should the compromises stop.
The experiences of some successful investors prove that focusing
efforts on extremely important issues and being prepared to compro-
mise other issues are sound negotiation tactics. These efforts need to
be planned well in advance to achieve a systematic approach. The com-
promises help demonstrate flexibility and good will; in return, the pri-
mary goals of the partners are secured. Normally, issues such as export
commitment, management control, and technology payment are the
most difficult to negotiate. If an investor wants to get a better deal, he
needs to determine where he is willing to concede points well in ad-
vance, not afterwards.
In order to achieve the goals already set, tactics such as team-
building are essential in order to win the support and understanding of
the partners. Some investors start involving their Chinese counterparts
in the decision-making process by jointly test marketing their products
in China, before a joint venture agreement is reached. Thus, the two
parties already work as partners before .a contractual relationship is
cemented. This process provides an excellent opportunity to build mu-
tual understandings, trust, appreciation of the technological and man-
agement merits of the partners, and the practical experience of work-
ing together. This "pre-marriage" relationship often helps remove
obstacles for the settlement of major issues.
E. Corporate Commitment
Many joint ventures fail because of a lack of corporate commit-
ment or a change of direction by corporate management. The initial
long-term objectives of the top managers of a corporation often clash
with the relatively short-term goals of the on-loan managers, due to the
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motivation and promotion mechanisms of the investing firms. Often,
the original long-term objectives conflict with a spontaneous greed for
short-term gains, thus affecting the management priorities of the joint
venture business.
In terms of resources, a weak link between the Chinese joint ven-
ture and the foreign corporate headquarters is common; corporate sup-
port in terms of people, technical assistance and marketing help is
often lacking. These deficiencies seriously undermine the long-term
stability of the established ventures and the confidence of Chinese
partners. It is worth noting that United States managers have the
shortest average terms of service in joint ventures in China - only six
months - compared to one year for West European managers and two
years for Japanese managers. The constant change of people and a
shortage of quality managers are already causing problems for some
joint ventures.
V. CONCLUSION
A strategy is needed for China, tailored to suit the realities of this
unique market. Naivetk, superficial thinking, and spontaneous action
should give way to common sense, solid planning, and strategic ap-
proaches. Tomorrow's winners in China's investment scene will be
those with greatest foresight, enterprise, and "can-do" spirit. An op-
portunity exists in China today for investors who are systematic, re-
sourceful, patient, courageous, and willing to learn from the experience
of others.
19891

